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ABSTRACT 
The early decades of the 20th century marked drastic changes in philosophy, science, 
visual arts, literature, and music. In philosophy, this change occurred in the work of 
Edmund Husserl whose Phenomenology introduced a new “way of knowing” or 
epistemology. In art, the exhibition of Pablo Picasso’s Cubist Les Demoiselles d’Avignon 
(1907), given its rebellious nature, began an innovative artistic tradition which called for 
a new “way of seeing.” Phenomenology as theory and Cubism as practice shared a 
common aim: to re-vision the world—an aim of many Modernist movements. Modernism 
is an umbrella term for a mélange of artistic schools and styles, which are characterized 
by such features as aesthetic self-consciousness, structural and thematic fragmentation, 
and a complexity of representation. Modernism contains Phenomenology and Cubism as 
twin attempts to re-vision and reconstruct the viewer’s experience of the object-world. 
The aim of this thesis is twofold: 1) to outline the complex vocabulary of Husserlian 
Phenomenology and Cubism, and 2) to apply those vocabularies to William Faulkner’s 
texts. As examples of visual and phenomenological perspectivism, Faulkner’s The Sound 
and The Fury and As I Lay Dying were explored for their correlations to Husserlian 
Phenomenology and Cubism. By utilizing artistic techniques drawn from Fauvism, 
Surrealism, and, Cubism, Faulkner’s novels provide literary samples for how artists 
reconstruct the world visually through their art. Husserlian Phenomenology likewise aims 
to reconstruct our human perceptions and experience.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modernism presents us with a world becoming a realm of appearances—
fragments, patchwork quilts of color, dream-tableaux made out of disconnected 
phantasms. 
 
—T. J. Clark, “The Painting of Postmodern Life?” (14) 
 
The beginning decades of the twentieth century witnessed fundamental and 
drastic developments in painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, philosophy, music, 
and the sciences. The arts of painting and sculpture celebrated the emergence of Henri 
Matisse, Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque, Marcel Duchamp, Jean Metzinger, Alexander 
Archipenko, and other brilliant, innovative artists. In philosophy and psychoanalysis, 
Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, and Edmund Husserl among others led revolutions in the 
study of human consciousness. In literature, Marcel Proust, Guillaume Apollinaire, James 
Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, and a host of others experimented with forms of 
writing; in fiction especially, they developed innovative and complex narrative 
techniques. All these artists, thinkers, authors participated in the same cultural movement: 
modernism. In an age of political and economic alienation, when forces of capitalism, 
mechanization, urbanization, and the seemingly all-powerful nation-state threatened the 
sovereignty of the individual, much of art retreated into the last remaining bastion of 
individualism: subjective experience. As an aesthetic movement, modernism explored 
our human “ways of seeing” within a larger philosophical project: an exploration of our 
human “ways of knowing” or epistemology.  
Modernism is a spacious container holding multiple, in fact contradictory 
attitudes and movements: other revolutions—of Marxism in political economy, of 
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expressionism and vorticism in art, of naturalism in literature, etc.—take their place in 
early twentieth-century intellectual-aesthetic culture, though not in this present thesis. It 
is not the sociology, but rather the subjectivist psychology, of modernism that is of 
interest here. In 1907, Edmund Husserl published his Phenomenology (Die Idee der 
Phänomenologie). In that same year, Pablo Picasso exhibited his legendary painting, Les 
Demoiselles d’Avignon. While there is no direct connection between these works, both 
represent an aspect of the Zeitgeist of modernism. Both works sought to re-vision the 
world. The insight that drove both Phenomenology and Cubism was that the human 
perceiver engages in an active construction of the object-world. For Husserl as for 
Picasso, the older traditions of an “objective” realism fail to describe our subjective 
“ways of knowing.” The subject cannot be alienated or removed from the object-world, 
since “knowing” is an activity that occurs between the knower and the phenomenon. And 
“knowing,” for Husserl as for Picasso, is a process that unfolds in time. In any given 
instant, only a portion of the object-world is presented to the perceiver. In traditional 
realist art, the observer “never [perceives] an object in its entirety but only a part of it, a 
side, a foreshortening” (Pedragosa 749). In order to perceive an object in its wholeness, 
the observer has to change location. Divided into separate instants of perception, all 
“knowing” is perspectivist—partial, fragmented. By “giving the lie” to realism, Cubism 
acknowledges the narrowness of any one sight-angle while using art as an antidote to that 
same narrowness of perspective. The flat canvas provides the space where multiple 
perceptions, perspectives, and temporalities can be constructed into a complex frame.  
Modernism contains Cubism and Phenomenology as twin attempts to reveal the 
constructed nature of the object-world. Phenomenology provides a vocabulary to 
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illuminate the aesthetic practice of Cubism. In the ways that they approach the object-
world, Phenomenology and Cubism are mirror-images of each other or isomorphic. 
While Cubism is “characterized by its representatives as an atheoretical or even 
antitheoretical movement” (Pedragosa 749), Phenomenology is a theory characterized by 
its study of the structures of consciousness. Hence, “What Cubism achieves by pictorial 
means is what Phenomenology achieves by theoretical means” (Pedragosa 749). In other 
words, Phenomenology is a theory whose destination is practice; its practice culminates 
in what Husserl terms the “transcendental attitude.” Cubism, by contrast, is a practice 
that gives birth to theory—specifically, a theory of constructionism. In philosophy, 
Husserl explored a new way of knowing; in art, the Cubists explored a new way of 
seeing.  
In his 1997 essay, “New Ways of Seeing the Old: Cubism and Husserlian 
Phenomenology,” Randall Slettene cites the French phenomenological philosopher 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who states that “The entire modern history of painting, with its 
efforts to detach itself from illusionism and to acquire its own dimensions, has a 
metaphysical significance” (Merleau-Ponty 178). Merleau-Ponty’s assertion is notable, 
due to “the connection he draws between modern art and philosophical concerns” 
(Slettene 104). As Slettene argues, a full understanding of the development of modern art 
requires that one comprehend “the correlation between the world of [the] aesthetic and 
the world of the metaphysical” (104). Though this same correlation holds throughout art 
history, it receives greater attention in modernism, due to the radical developments in 
both art and philosophy in the twentieth century. As Slettene notes, modernism is marked 
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by radical change and discontinuity in both these fields, in each case due (at least in part) 
to the “nature of visual perception” (104).  
As Slettene describes them, the correlations between movements in visual art and 
philosophy are of two kinds: “They are either the result of the direct and demonstrable 
influence of developments in one field upon the other, or they are causally unconnected, 
parallel developments that occur independently in each field at roughly the same time” 
(104). One striking instance of these parallel developments, Slettene notes, is the “twin 
emergence of cubism in painting and phenomenology in philosophy” (104). While 
Slettene is content to note their contemporaneity, other theorists have sought firmer 
connections between these fields. In Der Weg zum Kubismus, art historian Daniel-Henry 
Kahnweiler relates Cubism to “certain philosophies as their pictorial analogon” (Pinotti 
63). Among candidates for these “certain philosophies,” Kahnweiler includes neo-
Kantian idealism, the existentialist phenomenology of Henry Bergson, and the pre-
Freudian psychology of William James. But most interesting is Kahnweiler’s claim that 
“One day people will certainly try to discover the connections between cubism and a 
philosophy contemporary to it. It seems to me probable that Edmund Husserl will be 
taken into consideration, since his phenomenology remains a transcendental idealism” 
(Pinotti 64).  
Can one make similar correlations among literary art, visual art, and philosophy? 
In William Faulkner’s case, it appears that one can. Faulkner was among the modernist 
writers whose ground-breaking narrative techniques modulated the structure of the 
modern novel. The complete oeuvre of Faulkner demonstrates his abiding interest in 
painting. One would expect that his early interest in modern art had some influence on his 
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writing style and narrative techniques. Faulkner began drawing before he tried his hand at 
writing. Arguably, his experiments in the structure of the novel correlate with many of 
the innovations in modernist art, the Cubist movement particularly. His idea of how a 
novel should be written marks a disjunction from his “realist” predecessors, much like 
Picasso’s work diverged from artists before him.   
As Joseph Blotner states in Faulkner: A Biography, Faulkner referred to the act of 
novel writing as an act of building—a visual-spatial construction. Explaining how he put 
A Green Bough together, Faulkner stated, “I chose the best manuscripts and built a 
volume just like a novel” (Blotner 790; emphasis added). Quoting Faulkner in A Cosmos 
of My Own, Panthea Reid Broughton notes that “novels are spatial, not linear 
constructions” (36). According to Broughton, novelists of Faulkner’s generation wrote 
“not by tracing the linear development of a single plot line, but rather by building and 
arranging blocks of narrative with an eye for the sorts of patterns they were creating” 
(44). The correlation between Cubism and Faulkner’s literary modernism lies in their 
mirrored techniques: both seek to multiply perspectives, the former through visual 
recombination, the latter through narrative.  
Expanding Slettene’s approach to include literary modernism, this thesis will 
explore the correlations between Phenomenology and Cubism in Faulkner’s The Sound 
and The Fury and As I Lay Dying. It offers to situate his literary technique within two 
vital components of modernism: Phenomenology as theory and Cubism as practice. Of 
course, there are other ways of reading Faulkner, just as there are aspects of modernism 
that lie beyond the purview of this thesis. Cubism, like Phenomenology, “is an occasion 
to learn to see” (Pinotti 65). Can the same be said of Faulkner, that his fiction “is an 
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occasion to learn to see”? Faulkner scholarship has explored the presence of modernist 
art within his novels; this thesis will build upon and, perhaps, add to this scholarship.  
Chapter 1 outlines the complex vocabulary of Husserlian phenomenology. 
Chapter 2 outlines the visual-spatial techniques of Cubism. Chapters 3 and 4 apply these 
to Faulkner’s own perspectivist art. A thesis of this scope can offer, at most, a sampling 
of Faulkner’s visual/phenomenological perspectivism. It would be this work’s contention 
that examples can be further multiplied throughout Faulkner’s oeuvre, and that 
perspectivism can be shown to lie at the heart of his modernist aesthetic. In the following 
chapters, this thesis will attempt a way of reading that shows how such a claim can be 
demonstrated. If successful, this thesis will show how the Phenomenological and Cubist 
vocabularies can contribute to the ongoing discussion of Faulkner’s The Sound and The 
Fury and As I Lay Dying.  
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PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Natural objects … must be experienced before any theorizing about them can 
occur. 
 
—Edmund Husserl, “Pure Phenomenology” (125) 
 
During the same years that Picasso and Braque’s Cubism revolutionized painting 
and sculpture, dramatic changes were taking place in philosophy. In Germany, Edmund 
Husserl was taking courses in astronomy, mathematics, physics, and philosophy. 
Husserl’s mentor, the Czech philosopher Thomas Masaryk, was a former student of the 
German philosopher Franz Brentano, with whom Husserl came into contact and whose 
lectures were to have an enormous influence on Husserl’s philosophical maturation. In 
the years 1900 and 1901, Husserl published his first major work, Logical Investigations 
(Logische Untersuchungen). Written in two volumes, the first, titled Prolegomena to 
Pure Logic (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik), was a critique of psychologism.1 The 
second, titled Investigations in Phenomenology and Knowledge (Untersuchungen zur 
Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis), was a larger and more ambitious 
investigation into six different areas: (I) expression and meaning, (II) universals, (III) the 
formal ontology of parts and wholes (mereology), (IV) the “syntactical” and mereological 
structure of meaning, (V) the nature and structure of intentionality, and (VI) the 
interrelation of truth, intuition and cognition. The publication of Prolegomena to Pure 
Logic laid the foundations for Husserl’s analyses in Investigations in Phenomenology and 
                                                 
1 “Psychologism is a pejorative description for the view that psychology can account for 
the laws of logic” (Russell 9).  
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Knowledge which, subsequently, laid the groundwork for his mature phenomenology. He 
developed and refined his philosophical method into what he later called transcendental 
phenomenology, publishing his influential Ideas (Ideen) in 1913.  
Husserl believed that “Western philosophy was in need of a radical overhaul if it 
was to fulfill its mission of being the science of sciences, the foundational realm of 
systematic knowledge upon which the sciences, and in fact, the entire body of organized 
inquiry, were built” (Slettene 106). Husserl believed that if philosophy was to remain 
influential in the twentieth century, “its theoretical and epistemological foundations had 
to be clarified in ways that would avoid the cognitive shoals and reefs upon which so 
many metaphysical vessels had crashed” (Slettene 106). Husserl thought that the 
foundations of philosophy will remain firm only if philosophers “consider conscious 
experiences in the concrete fullness and entirety with which they figure in their concrete 
context—the stream of experience—and to which they are closely attached through their 
own proper essence” (Ideas 116). In other words, philosophers are required to analyze the 
units of consciousness in order to comprehend the world. In his book titled 
Phenomenology,2 Shaun Gallagher emphasizes two definitions:  
Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present 
themselves to us in and through such experience. (Robert Sokolowski, qtd. in 
Gallagher 7)   
 
Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from 
the first-person point of view. (David Woodruff Smith, qtd. in Gallagher 7)   
 
To illustrate the definitions and to put them into simple terms, it can be explained that 
Phenomenology is the study of phenomena. Edmund Husserl, who was known as the 
                                                 
2 As citations indicate, the following outline draws extensively on Gallagher’s discussion.  
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founder of phenomenology, focused on human consciousness. He believed that 
consciousness is like “our window onto the world” (Gallagher 9). Basically, modern 
philosophical Phenomenology tries to provide an account of how things appear to human 
awareness and how the world appears to human consciousness in terms of one’s 
subjective experience of it. In other words, Phenomenology reflects upon everyday 
experiences to gain a sense of their order and structure.  
The following section will present a brief overview of terms relevant to a 
Phenomenological reading of Faulkner. It will begin with an explication of the natural 
attitude. 
 
The Natural Attitude 
As mentioned previously, Phenomenology is a study of the units of 
consciousness; however, the ultimate aim is to achieve a “transcendental rather than a 
naturalistic analysis of consciousness” (Gallagher 41). To put it in simple terms, we are 
all familiar with the natural attitude without even being aware of it, because we naturally 
assume that the world around us is real, that we live in a real world, and that the objects 
around us are real (Gallagher 41). Hence, the natural attitude, by virtue of its nature, is 
usually taken for granted by all of us. Moreover, the natural attitude, as Gallagher notes, 
is “a very practical attitude to be in,” especially for our survival (41). All of us, despite 
our occupations and careers, experience the natural attitude — the real world around us 
that “characterizes our everyday life” — by immersing ourselves in the natural attitude 
(Gallagher 42). However, this sets the phenomenologist apart because she takes a 
different attitude by bracketing the natural attitude.  
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The Epoché 
As mentioned above, to be in the natural attitude comes, as the name suggests, 
very naturally to everyone. As people work, play, cook, eat, pay rent, and so forth, they 
are in the natural attitude. The phenomenologist, however, adopts a different approach by 
bracketing the natural attitude and, hence, moving into the phenomenological attitude. 
This happens by “[suspending] the natural attitude [in order] to disengage from it” 
(Gallagher 43). In other words, if the natural attitude consists of a “collection of beliefs, 
judgments, opinions, or theories about how things work, then to bracket these established 
beliefs and judgments is to set them aside” (Gallagher 43). Husserl calls this “the epoché 
— a Greek word for suspension of belief” (Gallagher 43). Bracketing does not negate the 
existence of the aforementioned beliefs and ideas; the phenomenon is still present to 
consciousness and one can describe it and how it appears within her experience. This is 
called the phenomenological residuum, which is what remains after performing the 
epoché (Gallagher 44).  
Husserl believed that consciousness is the only way to one’s understanding or 
knowing anything, and the epoché is the first step towards reaching philosophical 
understanding. When one suspends all preconceptions, incidental meanings, and 
judgements about an object—a book for instance—she suspends all scientific and 
metaphysical judgments about it. That does not necessarily mean that she is left with 
nothing, because she still has the fresh, unprejudiced “experience of the world” 
(Gallagher 44). Shaun Gallagher relates this to the idea of methodic doubt in Descartes’ 
Meditations, according to which Descartes begins to doubt everything because he cannot 
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trust his “perceptions or his reason” (45). This whole world could be merely a dream and 
the only thing one can be certain of is “the fact that he is doubting, which is a form of 
thinking” (45). In other words, the only thing one cannot doubt is doubting itself: the 
cogito — the “I think,” which is followed by ergo sum — “therefore, I am” (Gallagher 
45). As Gallagher explains, Husserl concurs with Descartes up to the point of cogito, 
which is the consciousness that “he can’t suspend or bracket out” (45).  
Again, applying the bracketing technique does not negate an object’s existence, 
because even if the epoché is executed, the consciousness of it remains. After one 
suspends all beliefs and judgments about the world, about the universe in toto, she still 
has her experiences of the world within which she is situated (Gallagher 45). For Husserl, 
“this world as experienced is the very starting point of knowledge” (Gallagher 45). The 
“stream of experience” remains, even after all judgements, beliefs, and opinions are 
removed. Therefore, what one sees, hears, feels, and perceives is the starting point and 
foundation of all subsequent knowledge (Gallagher 46). In other words, “all science starts 
with our consciousness” (Gallagher 46).  
To give an example, one may have a clear definition of an apple. She may even be 
able to provide a scientific definition for an apple as “fruit of the domesticated tree Malus 
domestica (family Rosaceae), one of the most widely cultivated tree fruits” (“Apple”). 
More generally, all meaning — the meaning of the world itself — can be traced 
back to experience — the way things appear to consciousness. Using the epoché, 
we can, without contradiction, cut through, as it were, the empirical connection 
between the experience and all thingly existence. We thereby achieve a kind of 
distinctio phaenoemonologica. But what does that mean? What kind of cutting 
through is that? Is it not true that experiences are experiences of experiencing 
humans and, hence, that they have a relationship to a body and in insertion in 
nature? Can I change anything about that? To be sure, it just so happens to be that 
way. But we can indeed consider the experiences in and for themselves, without 
considering them in their empirical relation. We can disengage each natural 
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positing (positing of the existence of nature) in the sense that we undertake 
scientific considerations, in which we make no use at all of any positing of nature 
and where, accordingly, these considerations keep their validity, whether or not 
nature or an intellectual-embodied world exists as such. (Gallagher 47) 
  
The Phenomenological Reduction  
The second step in the Husserlian method is the phenomenological reduction, 
which some phenomenologists believe to include the epoché. In other words, the whole 
process of reduction, including the epoché, could be referred to as the phenomenological 
reduction. The phenomenological reduction turns one’s “attention toward the phenomena 
as they appear” (Gallagher 47). In this step, what matters is what one experiences just as 
she experiences it, which leads to reflection on how one experiences and how things 
appear in that experience. In this step, it is essential that the individual describe what she 
experiences, which might be a complex phenomenon; but it is important to describe what 
she sees, and how she sees it—which is a remarkably unique experience (Gallagher 47). 
Even if she observes the same object twice or thrice, each of her experiences will be 
different from the previous one. Gallagher brings up an intriguing example:  
What you see, even if it’s a simple thing like the apple on the desk in front of you, 
may be somewhat complex. For example, in your visual experience of the apple 
you can note that you see a certain complex color—it’s red, but there are various 
shades of red that pattern the surface. Perhaps, it is not sitting in clear light and 
there are shadows falling across its surface. Nonetheless, you seem to see it as 
having a more-or-less consistent color, despite the variations that come from the 
shadows. Also, there are some things you can describe about its shape. But notice 
that you can’t see the entire apple all at once. You always see it in profile. It’s 
quite amazing that even though you can’t see its inside, you see that the apple has 
(must have) an inside. And although you can’t see the other side of the apple, you 
see it as having another side. In some way you see this without seeing the other 
side. Of course you can also manipulate the apple or your own position so that 
you see more of it. But there seems to be a rule here that says you can’t see more 
than one profile at a time, and you never see the entire apple at once, although you 
do see it as a whole. You can also explore the apple by touching it or by tasting it. 
If you close your eyes you can still describe what you learn from touching it and 
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manipulating it. Or you can take a bite and try to describe what you taste. Such 
explorations, however, only point to other ways in which the apple is perceived 
incompletely. (47) 
 
The preceding example illustrates Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, and it can be 
utilized to explain how a cubist painter perceives an objet d’art. This point will be 
explicated in detail in the section concerning Cubism.   
In this example, one depends upon perceptions and senses rather than theoretical 
or scientific knowledge; the above description is purely empirical rather than 
transcendental. What, then, makes Husserlian method transcendental? As Gallagher 
notes, “some phenomenologists refer to a transcendental reduction that takes the 
phenomenological reduction to another level” (48). In the example provided above, what 
the individual describes is not the apple itself but rather the “lived experience of the 
apple” (Gallagher 48). Hence, one will not claim that the apple is red but that she 
experiences it as red. Husserl attributes a kind of uniqueness to each experience of an 
object, because “when part of the experience is present, some previous part of it is no 
longer there” (Gallagher 49). Therefore,  
This experience of the apple has its own existence, and it exists in a certain way. 
Within that experience the apple appears from a certain perspective. This is the 
characteristic of the experience, not of the apple. Each experience presents the 
apple incompletely, and this is an essential feature of the way we experience 
things. (Gallagher 48; emphasis added) 
 
Hence, one cannot claim that “the apple is red, but that the apple appears to be red. This 
is where Phenomenology shares some common ground with the art of painting. Husserl 
points to the “finitude and partiality of our knowledge and perception of reality” 
(Pedragosa 749). As previously mentioned, one can only capture one side or aspect of a 
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given object; but, in order to have a thorough perception of that object, one needs to 
capture it as a multifaceted whole.   
Gallagher here refers to Husserl’s 1913 Ideas, where each experience is absolute 
and there is no other side to an experience per se that one can reach by means of that 
singular experience:  
When we attend to the experience itself—which is an attending to the way that we 
experience the world—we are starting to grasp certain aspects of experience that 
can be considered transcendental. There is here a certain a priori aspect that 
constrains every visual perception that we have, namely, that it involves a 
perspective which limits the way in which any object appears to us. (48-49)  
 
As Gallagher explains, this transcendental experience exists in one’s phenomenological 
intuition and is permeating in one’s visual experience of the world (49).  
 
The Eidetic Reduction  
It is only “within the transcendentally reduced sphere of consciousness [that] we 
can grasp the essence of the phenomenon” (Gallagher 49). Husserl calls this aspect of his 
method the eidetic reduction, which stems from eidos, a Greek term for essence. The 
eidetic reduction serves as an “imaginative variation” upon experience, by means of 
which one uses her “imagination to change various features of the phenomenon” 
(Gallagher 49). As Husserl describes this notion in Ideas, to explore consciousness is to 
undertake a search for its essence or eidos: that is, for the features of human experience 
that are both necessary and immutable and that, consequently, make one’s experience 
what it is. To further explain, once one has turned one’s reflective awareness toward 
experience by employing the phenomenological reduction, one can then undertake a 
second reduction—an eidetic reduction—with respect to some more specific question. 
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Husserl refers to a special moment in an individual’s reflective awareness, a moment that 
he calls an intuition, when the individual realizes the essential nature of a given object. 
The eidetic reduction helps create an intuition into something’s essence by employing a 
method known as imaginary variation, in which the individual varies all the possible 
attributes of an experience as a way of exploring what is truly necessary for the 
experience to be considered what it is. For instance, what characteristics make an apple, 
an apple? Gallagher gives the following example: 
We can imagine the apple we see on the table in front of us being bigger or 
smaller than it is; being green instead of red; being redder than it is; being more 
round than it is; being heavier or lighter than it is; being more or less sweeter than 
it is. We could imaginatively vary the way the apple appears by imagining 
walking around it or seeing it in a different context. There are all sorts of things 
that we could change about the apple. Through all of these changes it nonetheless 
remains an apple. (49; emphasis added)  
 
One may pose a myriad of questions about the apple and its distinguishing characteristics, 
i.e. all the qualities that make an apple and that assist one in recognizing an apple as an 
apple. Characteristics that are invariant are thus linked to the essence of an apple qua 
apple: as Gallagher states, “the essence of something is equal to the set of invariables that 
we can discover through this process of imaginative variation” (49). Therefore, the 
eidetic reduction is a means for gaining insight into essences (Wesensschau). 
 
The Theory of Intentionality  
It was mentioned earlier that Franz Brentano exerted a profound influence on the 
young Husserl; therefore, it comes as no surprise that Husserl insisted upon revisiting and 
revising Brentano’s ideas. One of the main concepts that Husserl borrows from Brentano 
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is the idea that consciousness is intentional3. Intentionality can be traced back to 
Aristotle, “who claims to be explicating a saying from Empedocles: ‘Like is known by 
like’ (homoia homoiois gignôsketei)” (Gallagher 62). Within Brentano’s model of 
intentionality,   
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by … what we might call, though not 
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which 
is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself … (Gallagher 63; 
emphasis added)  
 
As Gallagher notes, intentionality is “the ‘aboutness’ or the ‘directionality’ that is 
involved in perceiving or knowing anything” (63). Intentionality is also considered as the 
“mark of the mental” (Gallagher 64). Here, too, Gallagher refers to Brentano:  
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although 
they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in 
judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired, and so on. This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of 
mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena 
which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (64)   
 
According to Brentano, intentionality is concerned with two things:  
(1)The aspect of ‘aboutness’ or ‘direction toward an object’; and  
(2)The internal existence of the object perceived, judged, believed, loved, hated, 
etc. (Gallagher 64)   
 
Husserl acknowledges the first point, stating that “all consciousness is consciousness of 
something” (Gallagher 64). Intentionality is derived from the Latin term intendere, which 
means to “aim in a particular direction, similar to drawing and aiming a bow at a target” 
                                                 
3  This is a Husserlian term and is different from the English word as it is commonly 
used.  
 
 17 
(Gallagher 64). But Husserl takes issue with the second point, in that “perceived object is 
itself the intentional object, and …we have a direct perceptual access to that object, 
without any intermediary” (Gallagher 64-65). According to Husserl, when a physical 
object is perceived, or even when a non-physical object is imagined or conceived, it is 
imagined from a certain perspective. The Husserlian “imaginative variation” comes into 
play, since it is impossible for two people to perceive the same object from precisely the 
same angle. As Gallagher notes, “The way I see the palm tree next to my house is not 
precisely how you see it, since you see it from a different angle from where you stand; 
the way I think of Hamlet is not precisely how you think of Hamlet, since you’ve played 
the part and I haven’t” (65-66). This kind of consideration leads Husserl to the concept of 
noema. 
In Husserlian phenomenology, intentionality denotes two things simultaneously. 
First, the intentionality of consciousness means that it is actional in nature: that is, 
consciousness is always doing something. Second, the intentionality of consciousness 
means that it is referential in nature—that it is always pointing to something. In other 
words, when one perceives, feels, or judges or thinks, her “mental state is about or of 
something” (Gallagher 64; emphasis added).  The following visual schema (Fig 1) helps 
explain.  
 
Noesis-noema  
As it was mentioned previously, Brentano and Husserl established that “all 
consciousness is consciousness of something” as the first aspect of intentionality 
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(Gallagher 67). Moreover, they both believed that intentionality is a “directionality 
toward something” (Gallagher 68). Husserl rejected Brentano on the second aspect of        
 
 
intentionality which, according to Brentano, was the idea that “there is some kind of 
internal ‘inexisting’ intentional object in the mind” (Gallagher 68). Husserl, however, 
suggested that “consciousness has a certain structure which can be expressed as 
‘consciousness of something as something’” (Gallagher 68). Husserl differs from 
Brentano in the sense that he analyzes consciousness into two parts. The noesis refers to 
the act of consciousness in knowing, whereas the noema refers to the object as structured 
in consciousness. The relation between the two is what Husserl calls the noetic-neomatic 
Figure 1. Basic Phenomenological Concepts: Two perspectives of the same 
phenomena. Retrieved from webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/qualmethone.html, and has 
been edited to fit the purposes of this thesis.  
  
 
 phenomena 
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correlate. The noetic act of consciousness can stem from memory, imagination or 
perception (Gallagher 68). Here again, Gallagher sets forth an example:  
I can be conscious of the same object in different ways: I can perceive an apple 
tree, or remember one, or imagine one; I can judge the apple tree to be large; I can 
dislike the tree because it is blocking my view, etc…. My judgment may be fed 
by my memory of certain facts (I may remember falling out of an apple tree as a 
kid); by imagining certain things (e.g., imagining what it would look like if the 
apple tree were not there); by my dislike of apple trees, etc. likewise, my 
consciousness of the apple tree has one intentional object—the apple tree. But I 
am always experiencing the apple tree in a certain way. As perceived, it appears 
visually from a certain perspective. Like the apple on my desk, I can see the apple 
tree only from one side at a time, for example, although when I see it from one 
side I also implicitly see it as having more than one side. If the wind is blowing, 
or if clouds are interrupting the sunlight, the appearance of the tree is constantly 
changing. Also, if I move and change my angle of perception, there is a 
corresponding shift in appearance of the tree. Throughout all of these noematic 
changes, the intentional object is the same apple tree. Likewise, if I close my eyes 
and then remember what the apple tree just looked like; or if I imagined what that 
apple tree would look like in a different place; or if I judged that the apple tree 
was getting too big—all of these differences would have corresponding noematic 
changes. The noema is the meaning or sense (German: Sinn) that the apple tree 
has for me as I perceive or remember or judge, etc.—the apple tree as 
experienced, or as it appears to me. (Gallagher 68-69)             
                                                   
The object is the same in each of these cases, though what makes the experience different 
is the “character of the act of consciousness directed at it” (Gallagher 68). According to 
Husserl, “consciousness has this kind of intentional structure, where on one side we have 
the noetic act (or act of consciousness) and on the other side we have the noematic 
meaning—the way things are experienced” (Gallagher 69). In the above example, what 
one sees is not the noema, because noema is how one sees—the tree “as shimmering in 
the breeze,” for instance. Hence, as Gallagher notes, “the noema is to be understood 
neither as an ideal meaning, nor a concept, nor a proposition; it is not an intermediary 
between subject and object; rather, it is the object precisely as experienced” (70).   
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In sum, Husserlian phenomenology seeks to describe the workings of consciousness 
within our perception of the object-world. To move from the natural attitude toward the 
phenomenological and eidetic reduction is a goal of Husserlian method; as an exercise in 
perspectivism, much of Cubism can be described within the vocabulary outlined above.   
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CUBISM 
 
Cubism … is like standing at a certain point on a mountain and looking around. If 
you go higher, things will look different; if you go lower, again they will look 
different. It is a point of view.  
 
—Jacques Lipchitz (qtd. in Van Bork 199) 
 
Cubism: A Stylistic and Historical Phenomenon  
Cubism is an early twentieth-century avant-garde art movement which developed 
between the years 1907 and 1914 and impacted numerous artists, sculptors, musicians, 
and writers even after its decline from 1914 until about 1925. It was initiated by Georges 
Braque and Pablo Picasso in Paris, and, due to geographical, cultural, and historical 
reasons, it might never have been anything but a Parisian phenomenon had it not been for 
the cosmopolitan nature of that city, which attracted artists and writers from Spain, Italy, 
Germany, and other countries such as Russia and the Low Countries (Fry, Modern Artist 
11). Therefore, Paris, this cultural mecca, was the center for a gathering of great artistic 
minds “whose presence constituted an intellectual ‘critical mass’ that soon produced a 
series of revolutionary cultural explosions,” the first of which was in painting (Fry, 
Modern Artist 12).  
Labeled as “Fauvism” and commencing in 1904, the work of Henri Matisse and 
his followers “used color with unprecedented freedom, intensity and arbitrariness” (Fry, 
Modern Artist 12). Matisse was followed by André Derain and Maurice de Vlaminck in 
the discovery and admiration of African and Oceanic art, which impacted Cubism briefly.  
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Fauvism did not develop further than the late nineteenth century and it was, in 
nature, an expansion of such movements as the pointillism of Signac, “the brilliant 
coloristic achievements and expressive brushwork of Vincent Van Gogh, and Paul 
Gauguin’s decorative color patterns” (Fry, Modern Artist 12). Matisse’s Bonheur de 
Vivre (The Joy of life) (Fig 2), which does not offer any new concept of space or depth, 
represents the fundamentally representational nature of the Fauvist painting.  
 
 
It was in such an artistic background that Pablo Picasso’s Les Demoiselles 
d’Avignon (Fig 3) emerged in 1907, abandoning all known representation of traditional 
art. Though Picasso’s painting is often described as a further step down the path of  
Figure 2. Henri Matisse, Bonheur de Vivre (Joy of Life), oil on canvas, 1905-06. The 
Barnes Foundation, Philadelphia. Retrived from www.henrimatisse.org/joy-of-life.jsp 
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Fauvism, some critics believe that Picasso was in fact reacting against Matisse’s Bonheur 
de Vivre and Nu Bleu (Blue Nude). Les Demoiselles embraced new approaches to the 
concept of space and the expression of emotions and states of mind. Les Demoiselles, 
which is a revolutionary work of art, breaks away from the characteristics of Renaissance 
painting which followed “the classical norm for the human figure, and the spatial 
Figure 3. Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907, oil on canvas, Museum 
of Modern Art, New York City. Retrieved from www.pablopicasso.org/avignon.jsp  
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illusionism of one-point perspective” (Fry, Modern Artist 13). Picasso’s new approach to 
the human figure, which he had been pursuing for a year before completion of the 
painting, manifests itself “in such details as the reduction of human anatomy to 
geometrical lozenges and triangles, as well as in the abandonment of normal anatomical 
proportions” (Fry, Modern Artist 13). The influence of African sculpture is strikingly 
conspicuous in the mask-like faces of the two right-hand figures in the painting. 
Previously, Picasso had been fascinated by the elongated figures of  Doménikos 
Theotokópoulos—known as El Greco—and by the work of the post-Impressionist 
painter, Paul Gauguin, but the influence of African sculpture on his Les Demoiselles and 
his later work is indisputable.  
What Picasso was after—“the creation of a new system of indicating three-
dimensional relationships that would no longer be dependent on the conventions of 
illusionistic, one point perspective”—had been anticipated by Paul Cezanne, whose work 
Picasso had observed in various large exhibitions in Paris, beginning in 1904 (Fry, 
Modern Artist 14).    
As it was mentioned above, Phenomenology as a new “way of knowing” and 
Cubism as a new “way of seeing” were twin attempts at re-visioning reality. Andreas 
Pinotti states, “cubism does the same as phenomenology” (Pinotti 64). He adds, “Cubist 
painting is thus not an object of phenomenology among other objects, but is in itself 
phenomenological” (64). To explain Pinotti’s point, it is essential to go back to Husserl 
and his Ideas. Husserl develops his ideas around the concept of perception of an object 
which he connects to consciousness and experience. According to Husserl, one can never 
see an entire object all at once. In Ideas, he illustrates:    
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If I remain purely within the realm of seeing, I find new differences arising in 
very manifold form in the course of any normal seeing…. I express this somewhat 
in the following way: the pure thing seen that is visible “of” the thing, is first of 
all a surface, and in the changing course of seeing I see it now from this “side,” 
now from that, continuously perceiving it from ever different sides. But in them 
the surface exhibits itself to me in a continuous synthesis; each side is for 
consciousness a manner of exhibition of it. This implies that, while the surface is 
immediately given, I mean more than it offers. (Ideas 108)  
 
In the preceding passage, Husserl describes the constructivist activity of perception. Later 
in Ideas, he elaborates upon his example:  
Keeping this table steadily in view as I go around it, changing my position in 
space all the time, I have continually the consciousness of the bodily presence out 
there of this one and self-same table, which in itself remains unchanged 
throughout. But the perception of the table is one that changes continuously, it is a 
continuum of changing perceptions. I close my eyes. My other senses are inactive 
in relation to the table. I have now no perception of it. I open my eyes, and the 
perception returns. The perception? Let us be more accurate. Under no 
circumstances does it return to me individually the same. Only the table is the 
same, known as identical through the synthetic consciousness which connects the 
new perception with the recollection. (Ideas 130)   
 
Though the object remains, one’s perceptions “change continuously” (Ideas 130), making 
each perception a unique experience. Furthermore, one will always see the object from 
one side, so one can never see an object in its three-dimensionality; rather, the object will 
be perceived in single profile. As an act of imagination, however, the mind supplies the 
missing/hidden sides. The perceiver “knows” that the (hidden) sides of the object exist 
because of the “synthetic consciousness, which connects the new perception with the 
recollection” (Ideas 130). It is this synthetic consciousness that aids one’s recollection of 
the existence of the entirety (all the sides of the object) that makes the complete mental 
Gestalt of the object possible.  
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As mentioned, Cubism contributes to modernism a way of seeing that brings into 
practice the Husserlian phenomenological attitude. Taking Picasso’s Les Demoiselle 
d’Avignon as evidence, the painting depicts five nude ladies who are “constructed” out of 
geometrical lozenges and triangles. The right-hand figure is depicted in a seated position 
with her back to the viewer, but Picasso’s painting illustrates her full figure. By 
constructing an image of three-dimensionality within a two-dimensional space, Picasso 
enacts the Husserlian “synthetic consciousness,” which takes the backside of the figure 
and brings it to the forefront. According to Husserl, the viewer is not capable of seeing 
the figure in its entirety all at once, so the synthetic consciousness completes that image 
in one’s mind.  
Prior to Cubism, painters were constantly in search of a way to create the illusion 
of a three-dimensional space. Linear perspective and tonal gradation were among the 
techniques they used. Linear perspective is “a system of creating an illusion of depth on a 
flat surface. All parallel lines (orthogonals) in a painting or drawing using this system 
converge in a single vanishing point on the composition’s horizon line” (“Linear 
Perspective”). Similarly, tonal gradation in art is a “visual technique of gradually 
transitioning from one colour hue to another, or from one shade to another, or one texture 
to another. Space, distance, atmosphere, volume, and curved or rounded forms are some 
of the visual effects created with gradation” (Martin 36). By making objects bigger and 
much clearer when they are close-up, and smaller and less clear when they are further 
away, a painter can create the illusion of space. Similarly, painters can use tones 
(shadows) to create this illusion.  
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However, Cubists believed that the so-called “illusion of space” does not offer a 
very faithful image of reality—that is, it does not remain loyal to the physicality and 
spatiality of the object-world. Therefore, they attempted to provide a more real, accurate, 
and complete portrayal of an object, person, or landscape. The Cubist painter represents 
an object from various angles by “building it” out of flat geometric shapes. This approach 
displays the object from different sides simultaneously. Though it reduces three-
dimensional reality to a two-dimensional construct, still it represents a synthesis of 
perspectives.    
There are two phases of Cubism: analytical Cubism and synthetic Cubism. During 
the analytical phase, painters would (as the name suggests) analyze—in effect, “cut up” 
or take apart—the subject matter (whether an object, person, or landscape) in an attempt 
to provide a genuine and precise picture of its components. Having observed the subject 
closely, they would then show it using flat geometric shapes, lines, planes, and angles, 
eliminating one dimension and reinforcing the two-dimensional quality. In this early 
phase, Cubist painters used almost no tonal differentiation, so there would be no highly 
dark or highly light colors. Emphasizing muted tones, such as black, grey and ochre and 
the like, this analytical phase lasted until 1912. The austerity and gloominess of this 
phase gave place to the brighter colors and simpler lines and shapes of the synthetic 
phase around 1912. Cubists began using collage alongside paint to add texture to their 
work. Instead of portraying an object in its real shape, they would envisage a new 
structural relations between components and, by doing so, they would create a novel 
representation in the form of collage. This made extreme room for creativity and 
invention of unique approaches to painting.  
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In August 1925, Faulkner arrived in Paris, “that merry childish sophisticated cold-
blooded dying city to which Cezanne was dragged by his friends like a reluctant cow, 
where Degas and Manet fought obscure points of color and line and love, cursing 
Bougereau [sic] and his curved pink female flesh, where Matisse and Picasso yet painted” 
(Blotner 162-63). Faulkner’s preoccupation with art movements, especially the works of 
Cezanne and Cubists is evident in the letters he sent home. 
Similar to Gertrude Stein, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf, and multiple other 
modernist writers, William Faulkner experimented with verbal and narrative techniques 
in his novels and short stories. He began to draw and sketch at the same time as he wrote 
stories and composed poems. It is significant to note that, like Sherwood Anderson, 
Herman Hesse, D.H. Lawrence, and Henry Miller—all who practiced both writing and 
drawing or painting simultaneously—Faulkner experimented with both drawing and 
writing. 
Encouraged by his two brilliant mentors, Sherwood Anderson and William 
Spratling, Faulkner had considered studying art and a future career in painting before 
dedicating himself thoroughly to writing. Faulkner’s adroit mentor, William Spratling, 
was an American artist and silver-designer whose effort and influence rekindled the 
native silver craft. Since Spratling had been to the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris, he had 
thorough exposure to the Modern European arts, which he conveyed to Faulkner; in his 
further advice to Faulkner, he recommended that the young American educate himself 
prior to his European expedition.   
As mentioned above, the aim of this thesis is not to provide a phenomenological 
reading per se, but to demonstrate the correlation between Phenomenology and Cubism. 
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Both offer new ways of seeing and, as such, beg comparison to Faulkner’s novelistic 
techniques in The Sound and The Fury and As I Lay Dying. As Andrea Pinotti notes, “the 
real point … does not consist in a phenomenological interpretation of cubism … but 
rather in the hypothesis that cubism does the same as phenomenology” (64). He refers to 
Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger’s Du Cubism,  which defines multiperspectivity as 
“the simultaneous representation of the object in its various aspects that would be offered 
to perception only successively, gained through a rotation of the object or of the subject 
around the object” (Pinotti 64). By this illuminating observation, Gleizes and Jean 
Metzinger provide a more or less accurate account of how Cubism takes Phenomenology 
and outs its theory into practice.  
As previously discussed, in his Ideas and through the development of his 
phenomenological methods and ideas, Husserl provides a striking illustration of how one 
perceives an object. It is the act of consciousness that makes the object appear as a unity: 
so even though one does not perceive the entire object, she synthesizes it imaginatively, 
thereby maintaining its integrity as a multi-sided phenomenon. What Husserl explains is 
what Picasso sought after: “the creation of a new system of indicating three-dimensional 
relationships that would no longer be dependent on the conventions of illusionistic, one-
point perspective” (Fry, Modern Artist 14). The Cubists attempted to bring into vision the 
entire object so the observer can see the object in its entirety.  
Faulkner’s The Sound and The Fury and As I Lay Dying both function 
analogously to Husserlian Phenomenology and the Cubists’ idea of perception. The 
novels’ fragmented structures and multiple narrators work in such a way as to synthesize 
the few events Faulkner has chosen to recount. Furthermore, by devoting individual 
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sections to each character, Faulkner provides accounts of each character’s different point 
of view, similar to what Husserl explains about each person’s different experiences. To 
provide an aide-memoire, according to his phenomenological reduction, when one 
perceives an object, what one experiences is unique; so even if one observes the same 
object repeatedly, each of her experiences is different from the previous ones. In the 
following chapter, this thesis will provide examples of this larger correlation between 
Cubist perspectivism, Husserlian Phenomenology, and Faulknerian experiments in 
structure.  
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FAULKNER’S THE SOUND AND THE FURY 
 
In . . . modernist novel[,] the attention turns inward to the movements of the 
protagonist’s minds and consequently the external world is presented as a 
fragmented perception through a series of overlapping interior impressions. 
 
—Maria Teresa Cabrera, “Benjy’s Memory and Desire” (1) 
 
Written and published in 1929, The Sound and The Fury is Faulkner’s fourth 
published novel. Set in in Jefferson, Mississippi, the novel is built out of four separate, 
distinct narratives, each belonging to a different member of the Compsons, a family of 
former Southern aristocrats who are struggling with the dissolution of their family and its 
reputation. The title of the novel is taken from Macbeth’s soliloquy in Act V, Scene V of 
William Shakespeare’s tragedy, Macbeth:  
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow, 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day, 
To the last syllable of recorded time; 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! 
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player, 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing. (5.5.19-28)  
 
The title is appropriate, given that a section of The Sound and The Fury is indeed “told by 
an idiot” (SF 5.5.26-27), Benjy. By describing life as a “tale,” Shakespeare’s Macbeth 
hits on a popular modernist theme: in place of objective “history,” Faulkner gives his 
readers competing narratives. Whether these narratives “signify” anything beyond 
“sound” and “fury” is debatable. Before literary modernism, novels were typically 
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narrated from a singular point-of-view, sometimes first-person, sometimes third-person. 
This unified presentation can be compared to the vanishing-point perspective of classical 
painting: the visual composition is designed to be viewed from one single, privileged 
standpoint. (To view the artwork from any other standpoint creates visual distortions.) By 
fragmenting the “family history” of the Compsons into four distinct narratives by four 
distinct narrators, Faulkner builds a sort of Cubist multiperspectivism into the novel’s 
structure.   
The novel was initially criticized for its untraditional structure. Eventually, as 
readers became more familiar with modernist techniques, Faulkner’s experimentations in 
structure won much-deserved praise. The stream-of-consciousness technique, which was 
initially practiced by European modernist writers such as James Joyce and Virginia 
Woolf, emphasizes the subjectivity of experience—which, as it moves associatively from 
moment to moment, captures fragments of the object-world. More than interpret, 
Faulkner’s reader must construct the multi-layered plot imaginatively, walking around its 
multi-perspectives. In this sense, reading Faulkner resembles the Husserlian “eidetic 
reduction,” which relies on memory and imagination to synthesize disparate perceptions. 
Though the whole is never “objectively” present to the reader/perceiver, the perceiver 
nonetheless builds a Gestalt, however subjective and fleeting, out of shifting standpoints.  
Following Husserlian Phenomenology, each of Faulkner’s characters has a unique 
way of perceiving the object-world. Therefore, the uniqueness of each individual rests in 
the uniqueness of his or her experience—his or her ways of being “in the world.” Each 
narrator’s perspective in The Sound and The Fury is individual, subjective, and 
expressive of his or her unique character. This chapter’s focus will be on Benjy 
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Compson’s subjective experience and unique perception of the object-world. Also, there 
will be an exploration of the techniques of “cast shadow” and the multiplication of 
perspectives in Benjy’s narration.  
As Leon Edel describes it, Benjy’s section requires a new way of reading, one that 
gives up chronology and causality in narrative—the stuff of traditional “realism.” Benjy’s 
section is nonlinear, and the reader should attempt to experience Benjy’s consciousness 
as it is presented. Edel writes, "Indeed, when an author elects to tell us a story in this 
fashion, it would seem logical to follow him in his premises and not to construct new 
ones. In accepting the material in its scrambled state and seeking to understand it, we are 
invited by Faulkner to place ourselves within the angle of vision or perception of Benjy; 
we are involved with point of view” (164; emphasis added). Though Edel is unaware of 
the Phenomenology underlying this description, his reference to Benjy’s unique “angle of 
vison” accords with the Husserlian eidetic reduction. In other words, our task is to 
experience the world as Benjy experiences it; in which case, our own fragmented 
perceptions are privileged over our attempts at meaning-making (that is, at rendering 
Benjy’s narrative into a coherent, “realist” world-picture). From a Husserlian perspective, 
it is not the meaning but, rather, the experience of Benjy’s world that readers are to strive 
for. 
The novel begins with the narration of Benjy, who is the thirty-three-year-old, 
mentally-handicapped son of the Compsons. Benjy’s section has the most convoluted 
narration, not due merely to the complicated vocabulary and sentence structures, but due 
to the narrative techniques that Faulkner employs in the writing of this section. Some of 
these techniques—like stream of consciousness, dislocation of time and space, and 
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repetition—belong to the artistry of the novel, while others, like “cast shadow,” belong to 
surrealist art. 
 It’s curious to consider the possibility that Benjy’s consciousness comes closest 
to pure perception—what Husserl calls the Phenomenological reduction—in transcending 
the “prison house” of language. Unfettered by abstraction and prejudgment, his 
perceptions come as raw sensual data. More than other characters, his experiences 
commune closely with the object-world. Still, the concreteness of his experience comes at 
a price: lacking language, Benjy remains “trapped” in his own subjectivity.  
By its visual nature, painting privileges concrete perception over linguistic 
abstraction. Simonides of Ceos’s expression that “Painting is mute poetry” (qtd. from 
Plutarch, Moralia (346 f) in Jean Hagstrum 10) reinforces this point beautifully; as 
Leonardo da Vinci famously stated, “Painting is poetry that is seen rather than felt, and 
poetry is painting that is felt rather than seen.” Taken literally, these artists declare the 
epistemology of eyesight: the eye has its own “ways of knowing” that exceed language.  
Benjy’s section does not provide any evidence of him communicating through 
words with other characters, and that might have been the reason some critics refer to him 
as deaf and dumb. Benjy might be mute throughout the story, but Faulkner portrays him 
through other means of communication. The “words” constituting Benjy’s section are, in 
Husserlian terms, “bracketed.” They stand in the place of raw perception. That is, we are 
meant to look “through” the words, and not “at” them. To achieve the Phenomenological 
reduction implicit in Benjy’s perceptions, we must “translate” his words into the bright 
color-palette of a Fauvist painter. For Benjy’s consciousness presents the object-world as 
a moving canvas of bright colors and shapes. 
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Again, Faulkner is helping readers experience the object-world in a manner evocative of 
Husserl’s Phenomenological reduction.  
 
Benjy’s Artistic Vision  
It is presumable that Faulkner was acquainted with art movements such as 
Dadaism and Surrealism, for which Cubism was a source of inspiration. Around 1912, 
after Cubism had completed its development and began its decline, several other 
movements arose to join it and, eventually, take its place. Born in Zurich in 1916, 
Dadaism was an avant-garde art movement developed in reaction to World War I. Not 
surprisingly, the work of Dadaists challenged the reigning aesthetics of art; and, 
following in the steps of other artists of the time, Dadaists published a collection of their 
principles in Hugo Ball’s 1916 Dada Manifesto. Even though Dadaism had come to an 
end by 1920, its participants joined, and brought many Dadaist elements to, the Surrealist 
Movement, which was pioneered by Andre Breton. In 1924—the year before Faulkner’s 
arrival in Paris—Breton published Le Manifeste du Surréalisme in the French capitol 
city.   
Dadaism and Surrealism remained popular, due to their practitioners’ involvement 
in Parisian social gatherings, demonstrations, and soirees.  As mentioned above, Faulkner 
began as a graphic artist, and, therefore, he would have been keenly interested in the 
French avant-garde art movements, namely Cubism, Dadaism, Futurism, and Vorticism. 
Curiously, their influence would be felt in his fiction more than in his graphic art. 
Faulkner’s drawings followed the accepted and traditional rules of representational art, 
which had been scorned by the practitioners of these new movements. In a letter to his 
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mother dated September 21, Faulkner wrote, “And Cezanne! That man dipped his brush 
in light like Tobe Caruthers would dip his in red lead to paint a lamp-post” (Selected 
Letters 47). Faulkner’s description suggests an excessive piling-on of paint that calls 
attention to its texture on canvas. It is the raw, sensuous effect, rather than the illusionist 
subject, that caught Faulkner’s eye.    
Richard P. Adams cites a 1958 interview, which emphasizes the impact of 
Cézanne, Impressionism, and Post-Impressionism on Faulkner. In the interview, Kraige 
Klosson asked Faulkner  
to comment on the theory of a critic "who is of the opinion that on your first trip 
to France you became familiar with the works of several of the French 
impressionists, and especially Cézanne, and who has found a similarity in your 
use of color in your books and Cézanne's use of color in his paintings." Faulkner 
said, "I think that criticism probably has a great deal of merit in it. As I was 
saying before, a writer remembers everything he ever reads or ever sees and then 
when he needs it, he draws upon his memory and uses it." Mr. Klosson pressed 
for a more definite statement: "Then, Sir, when you were in Paris you did go to 
the art galleries and did [you] see and remember the paintings of Cézanne?" 
Faulkner said, "Yes, that's right.” (qtd. in Branch 46-47)  
 
What Adams refers to here is not Cézanne’s use of color per se, but, rather, to his manner 
of “laying on patches of color” on canvas, “until the forms emerged” (qtd. in Branch 47). 
This was a method which involved the viewer equally as the painter, since it demanded 
that the viewer “enter into the process of constructing the picture along with the painter, 
to recapitulate and bring to life the painter’s experience of the scene” (Branch 47). 
Therefore, while the overall structure of Faulkner’s novel has strongest resemblance to 
Cubism, Faulkner’s imagery—particularly in Benjy’s section—draws locally on other art 
movements, such as Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Futurism, and Vorticism 
(Hönnighausen 559).   
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In 1924, the poet and critic André Breton published The Surrealist Manifesto. As 
he described this movement, “surrealism was a means of reuniting conscious 
and unconscious realms of experience so completely that the world 
of dream and fantasy would be joined to the everyday rational world in ‘an absolute 
reality, a surreality’” (“Surrealism”). Benjy’s inability to distinguish mirrored-reflected-
shadowed images from concrete objects makes for a further complexity in perception. 
While his experience of the natural world remains largely Fauvist, his engagements with 
other humans (and with himself as a shadow-casting human) make for Surrealist effects. 
In Benjy’s section, the terms “shadow,” “window,” “mirror,” and “shapes” recur. First, it 
is suggestive in his narration that Benjy perceives shadows “surrealistically,” since he 
observes them walk independently of the object (whether human or natural) to which 
they are bound: “The flower tree by the parlor window wasn’t dark, but the thick trees 
were. The grass was buzzing in the moonlight where my shadow walked on the grass” 
(SF 46). Benjy puts it as though he considers his shadow a separate human being: “We 
went along the brick walk, with our shadows. The pig pen smelled like pigs. The cow 
stood in the lot, chewing at us. Dan howled” (SF 35). He insists, “Our shadows moved, 
but Dan’s shadow didn’t move except to howl when he did” (SF 35). Benjy claims, “We 
went down the steps, where our shadows were,” as though they and their shadows are 
separate individuals, and their shadows have been anticipating them down the steps rather 
than accompanying them. In another part, Benjy observes: “Our shadows were on the 
grass. They got to the trees before we did. Mine got there first. Then we got there, and 
then the shadows were gone. There was a flower in the bottle. I put the other flower in it” 
(SF 54). This descriptive technique recalls the 1962 Surrealist painting by Remedios 
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Varo, titled Fenomeno (Fig 4), which might make the understanding of Faulkner’s 
personification easier. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Remedios Varo, Fenomeno. 1962, oil on masonite, private collection. This 
painting is retrieved from http://remedios-varo.com/obras-remedios-varo/decada-
1960/fenomeno-1962/ 
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In Varo’s painting, since each individual (the man and his shadow) are separate 
beings, their perceptions and experiences are also unique and separate from each other. 
This makes for a Surrealist variation on Husserl’s Phenomenological reduction, since 
both the man and his shadow will have different angles of seeing.  
In another passage, Benjy observes: 
"Caddy." Father said. Jason was crying. He wasn't fighting anymore, but we could 
see Caddy fighting in the mirror and Father put me down and went into the mirror 
and fought too. He lifted Caddy up. She fought. Jason lay on the floor, crying. He 
had the scissors in his hand. Father held Caddy. "He cut up all Benjy's dolls." 
Caddy said. "I'll slit his gizzle." "Candace." Father said. "I will." Caddy said. "I 
will." She fought. Father held her. She kicked at Jason. He rolled into the corner, 
out of the mirror. Father brought Caddy to the fire. They were all out of the 
mirror. Only the fire was in it. Like the fire was in a door. (SF 64-65) 
 
This part of Benjy’s section combines Cubist and Surrealist effects. First, from where he 
stands, and from the angle he looks, “we could see Caddy fighting in the mirror” (SF 65). 
When Benjy states, “Father went into the mirror and fought too,” he has effectively 
doubled the images of these figures, seeing them both front-and-back. (Such is the effect 
of observing figures that stand in front of a mirror.) When Caddy kicks Jason, “He [rolls] 
into the corner, out of the mirror,” and it is as though Jason exits the frame of 
perception—as if he had truly been “inside” the mirror physically, rather than merely a 
surface image. As Benjy perceives it, the mirror multiplies perspectives—like a cubist 
painting. It also, for Benjy, provides a substitute reality—a surreality.     
In another part of the first fragment of the novel, Benjy describes: “There was a 
fire. It was rising and falling on the walls. There was another fire in the mirror, I could 
smell the sickness” (SF 61). From where he stands, Benjy sees two fires instead of one 
and counts the reflection of the fire as a second real fire. Another character would not 
have the same perception, but for Benjy, there are two fires.  
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The technique of visual repetition has long been practiced by painters, illustrators, 
and sculptors. In the same way, Cubists used repetition as a technique, and what appeared 
in the works of Pablo Picasso, George Braque, and Juan Gris was subsequently practiced 
by writers such as Gertrude Stein, who “wrote portraits or still lives of people, groups or 
things repeating words and sentences over and over again with small variations or 
gradual modulations (Steidele 149). Writing of Stein’s Book Concluding With As A Wife 
Has A Cow: A Love Story, Angela Steidele argues that Stein “circles her subject and 
defines it in a way analogous to the analytic Cubist’s presentation of an object from 
successive points of view” (Steidele 149).  Stein exhausts her narration with the 
employment of endless repetitions.  As in modernist painting, repetition multiplies 
perspectives in Benjy’s section of The Sound and The Fury.  
At the beginning of Benjy’s section, Caddy insists, “Keep your hands in your 
pockets, Caddy said. Or they’ll get froze. You don’t want your hands froze on Christmas, 
do you” (SF 5). Variations of the same sentence are repeated on different pages by other 
characters, as well. Also, at the beginning of his narration, Benjy claims:  
I could hear Queenie's feet and the bright shapes went smooth and steady on both 
sides, the shadows of them flowing across Queenie's back. They went on like the 
bright tops of wheels. Then those on one side stopped at the tall white post where 
the soldier was. But on the other side they went on smooth and steady, but a little 
slower. (SF 11) 
 
 The preceding paragraph has a parallel in Dilsey’s section:  
Ben's voice roared and roared. Queenie moved again, her feet began to clop-clop 
steadily again, and at once Ben hushed. Luster looked quickly back over his 
shoulder, then he drove on. The broken flower drooped over Ben's fist and his 
eyes were empty and blue and serene again as cornice and facade flowed 
smoothly once more from left to right, post and tree, window and doorway and 
signboard each in its ordered place. (SF 320-21)   
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The repetition of words and images makes it appear as though the novel sits between two 
mirrors, each reflecting the other. This mirroring occurs between other Faulkner’s 
characters as well, such as between Quentin Compson and Darl Bundren, Benjy and 
Vardaman, Caddy and Addie, and Mr. Compson and Anse. 
While examples can be multiplied, the analyses above should demonstrate that 
The Sound and the Fury incorporates a variety of artistic techniques drawn from 
Fauvism, Surrealism, and, Cubism. This, in itself, is a point worth making. Of equal 
importance is the effect of these techniques upon Faulkner’s readers: just as avant-garde 
artists reconstruct the world visually, so Husserlian Phenomenology seeks to reconstruct 
our human perceptions and experience. The life-worlds of Faulkner’s narrators differ, 
because their “ways of knowing” differ. And, in reading, we experience their life-worlds 
from within our own. For instance, Benjy observes: “We went down the steps, where our 
shadows were” (SF 35). Here we, as readers, are placed inside two perspectivist frames, 
both Benjy’s and his shadow’s. From where he stands—above the stairs—Benjy cannot 
see things from the same angle as his personified shadow. Yet we, as readers and 
imaginative viewers of this scene, have access to both perspectives. And, because we can 
synthesize our own experiences phenomenologically, we achieve a multi-perspectivist 
attitude that the characters themselves cannot reach.  
Faulkner continues his modernist-art experimentations in his fifth novel, As I Lay 
Dying—the subject to which this thesis now turns. 
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AS I LAY DYING 
 
This fragmentary structure is the core of Faulkner’s novelistic vision, describing a 
world of broken orders, a world in which the meetings of men and words need to 
be imagined again.  
 
—Donald M. Kartiganer, The Fragile Thread (xiii) 
 
[By] repeating geometric designs—lines and circles, verticals and horizontals—
Faulkner actually facets, like a cubist painting, the design of this book. That is 
why it is so difficult to speak of theme in As I Lay Dying. Here we have a work of 
fiction that comes remarkably close to being an exercise in pure design, a true 
tour de force, a cubist novel.   
 
—Panthea Reid Broughton, “Faulkner's Cubist Novels” (93)  
 
Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying begins: “Jewel and I come up from the field, following 
the path in single file. Although I am fifteen feet ahead of him, anyone watching us from 
the cotton house can see Jewel’s frayed and broken straw hat a full head above my own” 
(3). These opening sentences embody the perspectivism explored in previous chapters. 
By referencing the distance between himself and Jewel, Darl Bundren briefly invites a 
side-angle view, one that observes the space of fifteen feet that separates them. Darl is 
himself imagining the distance. As he walks, he looks ahead but imagines what is behind 
him; at the same time, he calls attention to (and, thus, is aware of) the path on either side. 
The world that he walks in is three-dimensional, though he can only imagine (in 
Husserlian terms, conserve) what appears behind him. But then, in his imagination, he 
takes himself out of his own synthetic, spatial experience and creates another perception 
entirely. He imagines himself as seen from another viewpoint—by another person, an 
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“anyone,” up ahead in the cotton house. What that outside viewer “can see” is, in effect, a 
modernist image: a flattening of space from three to two dimensions, with Darl and Jewel 
fused into a single, surrealist image. Flattening out the physical distance that separates 
Jewel’s head from his own, Darl imagines their heads as if stacked on a totem pole.  
It is thematically significant that the novel opens with a “painterly” perception 
that multiplies visual angles and perspectives. Darl sees from one viewpoint, the path and 
cotton house straight ahead of him; he conserves or imagines another viewpoint, of Jewel 
walking behind; and he constructs a third viewpoint, of himself and Jewel being observed 
by another person. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena—that is, of “appearances.” 
For Husserl, the viewer constructs the object-world out of an active synthesis of primarily 
visual perceptions and imaginings. In offering to read Faulkner phenomenologically, this 
thesis makes no claims that Faulkner had direct knowledge of Husserl or of other 
existential/ phenomenological studies. After all, Husserl’s philosophy seeks to describe 
what actually happens when people experience the object-world. By describing the 
means to achieve the “transcendental attitude,” his method seeks to refine people’s 
experience by reawakening and enriching perception; but, basically, Husserl is providing 
a vocabulary to describe people’s “ways of knowing.” Hence, a phenomenological 
reading of Faulkner (or of any modern novelist) uses the Husserlian vocabulary to 
highlight the perceptions and experiences of literary characters and the ways they 
construct those experiences into coherent life-worlds. Characters’ life-worlds will be 
unique, because their experiences will be unique.  
Additionally, Faulkner invites this sort of reading through his awareness of 
modernist art; as mentioned in previous chapters, the visual arts put into practice what 
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Phenomenology presents in theory. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate 
Faulkner’s acquaintance with modernist-art movements, particularly Cubism and 
Surrealism. Though As I Lay Dying follows The Sound and the Fury chronologically, 
these works belong to the same period in Faulkner’s literary development: The Sound and 
the Fury was published in 1929, while As I Lay Dying was composed in 1929 and 
published the year following. This chapter surveys criticism on the latter novel, which 
incorporates modernist-art techniques into several characters’ perceptions. As critics 
attest, As I Lay Dying makes bold thematic use of modernist art; for this reason, it helps 
reinforce claims made in the previous chapter. Though the focus here remains on 
criticism pertaining to Faulkner’s modernist-art techniques generally, some original 
character-analysis (particularly with respect to Vardaman’s Surrealist imagination) will 
be offered.     
Written in only six weeks in 1929 and published in 1930, William Faulkner’s As I 
Lay Dying recounts the story of the Bundrens, who live on a rural farm in Mississippi in 
the 1920s. The story is narrated by fifteen characters over fifty-nine chapters. The title of 
the novel is derived from Book XI of Homer’s Odyssey, where Agamemnon speaks to 
Odysseus: “As I lay dying, the woman with the dog’s eyes would not close my eyes as I 
descended into Hades” (566). The story narrates the Bundrens’ journey to bury their dead 
mother.  
Later in the novel, Darl Bundren makes specific reference to Cubism: “The front, 
the conical façade with the square orifice of doorway broken only by the square squat 
shape of the coffin on the sawhorses like a cubist bug, comes into relief” (AILD 219). As 
Watson G. Branch notes, Darl’s description creates a “cubist painting by reducing the 
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three-dimensional barn to geometric shapes—conical and square—flattened to the two-
dimensional surface of the façade with the coffin and sawhorses brought up to the plane 
of the empty doorway” (117). Branch elaborates:   
Darl often exhibits specific Cubist techniques in the verbal constructs by which he 
expresses his view of the world: geometric patterns of juxtaposed forms, multiple 
points of view, collages, emphasis on two-dimensional surface rather than three-
dimensional depth, and dislocation and disorientation of forms in space. (Branch 
48)  
 
In his study of Darl Bundren’s character, Watson G. Branch contends that Darl’s 
experience “in France at the war” exposed him to Cubism, which then shapes his 
imagination: 
First, the war showed Darl absurd and wasteful death (and, by extension, absurd 
and wasteful life) on a scale unimaginable to him had he remained at home in 
Yoknapatawpha County. Second, the exposure to contemporary movements in the 
plastic arts—especially Cubism, which had been prevalent in Paris for a decade 
before American soldiers got there—provided Darl with a mode for conceiving 
reality commensurate to the disorientation he felt. (42)   
The war experience had traumatized Darl, slowly eroding his sanity. Branch quotes 
Ronald Sutherland in this regard:   
Darl has been overseas during the World War, which undoubtedly played havoc 
with his sensitive nature, broadening his awareness and deepening his 
sensibilities, creating a problem of readjustment to the temporarily forgotten 
crudeness of home life—a grotesque kind of crudeness which the atmosphere of 
the novel vividly impresses upon the reader. It is significant that Faulkner had 
Darl avoid mention of the war until the last, when, on the train to Jackson, he is 
rapidly losing his grips on sanity and is speaking of himself in the third person. 
(Sutherland 543-44; qtd. in Branch 43-44)  
 
In sum, Darl’s exposure to European art in France provided him with a “source for 
certain imagery—imagery that is the major qualitative feature that sets his language apart 
from that of the other characters” (Branch 44).  
One might add that Darl retreats into Cubism as a mental escape from the traumas 
of life past and present. By framing his suffering, Darl’s Cubism describes a desperate 
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artistry. As Lothar Hӧnnighausen notes, “Darl, a persona of the artist, often adopts a 
painterly view of the reality he so obsessively registers” (560; emphasis added). 
Hӧnnighausen is right. However, Darl’s artistry is symptomatic of the man’s mental 
fragmentation, suffering, and breakdown. It is his own shattered world that Darl frames 
within the cold two-dimensionality of Cubist shapes. There is, perhaps, a paradox in 
Faulkner’s use of Cubism, in that there is no healing through its constructs. Darl’s 
“painterly view” (Hӧnnighausen 560) does not bring him more concretely “into the 
world.” Rather, it marks his alienation and mental isolation.  
Alienation, isolation, and fragmentation do not belong to Darl alone; these are 
features of the “modernist condition” that artists contemporary to Faulkner sought to 
explore and exploit—and, often, to critique. In his 1919 book, Quelques Intentions du 
Cubisme, Maurice Raynal offered Cubism as a way of “knowing” that frees itself from 
extraneous details:  
To conceive an object is, in fact, to aim at knowing it in its essence, at 
representing it in the mind … as purely as possible, as a sign, as a totem if you 
like, absolutely free of all the useless details such as its aspects—accidental 
factors which are too numerous and too changeable. (Raynal 152; qtd. in Tucker 
395)  
 
As describes it, the Cubist artist structures perception by a process of mental reduction. In 
his book, The Moment of Cubism, John Berger explains:  
[The cubists] reduced forms to a combination of cubes, cones, cylinders—or, 
later, to arrangements of flatly articulated facets or planes with sharp edges—so 
that the elements of one form were interchangeable with another, whether a hill, a 
woman, a violin, a carafe, a table or a hand. Thus, as against the Cubist 
discontinuity of space, they created a continuity of structure. (Berger 28)  
 
It is John Tucker’s contention that Faulkner applied this same “visual logic” to the 
structure of narrative (396).  
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As Tucker notes, the journey of the Bundrens to Jefferson to bury their mother is 
not a single story, but a recounting of experience by multiple narrators, each with its 
distinctive “textual voice” (393):   
Textual voice is not subordinate to representation. At the same time that the novel 
disrupts mimetic voices and thus calls our attention to them as voices, it insists on 
its identity as a text. In As I Lay Dying voices (mimetic and textual) are constantly 
breaking the novel's perceptual “surface” (the print we see, the language we 
recognize, the speakers we “hear”) into unexpected discursive planes, the way a 
cubist painting shatters representational images so that the painting can assert the 
image of itself. (Ross 308)  
 
There is a paradox here, in that the Cubist “image” achieves its unity by “shatter[ing]” the 
sorts of shifting temporal perceptions fostered by traditional, “representational” art. Thus, 
when Tucker writes that “the novel as a whole exhibits specific cubist techniques” (391; 
emphasis added), the “whole” that he references consists of a series of textual fragments 
whose descriptions become arrested or frozen within or “dissolved” into abstract 
geometric frames, shapes, and attitudes.  
As Darryl Hattenhauer observes, “the geometric spatial abstractions in As I Lay 
Dying inform the setting and the plot,” while “the spatiality of setting and plot in turn 
shape the characters” (146). In effect, Faulkner’s modernist narrative technique reduces 
characters (or reduces his narrators’ perceptions of characters, themselves often included) 
to objets d’art. Addie rests in death, metamorphized into her coffin (AILD 88); Jewel and 
Gillespie stand “like two figures in a Greek frieze” (AILD 221); Darl watches his brother 
as he “crosses the floor in four strides with the rigid gravity of a cigar store Indian" 
(AILD 4). Similar Cubist object-reductions recur throughout the narrative. Remaining 
paragraphs will sample several of the visual techniques by means of which Faulkner 
achieves these effects. 
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Darryl Hattenhauer asserts that “the circle is associated with death” (146) in this 
novel. He offers several examples. When Addie dies, Darl describes “her eyes … like 
two candles when you watch them gutter down into the sockets of iron candle-sticks” 
(AILD 8). When Vardaman witnesses Addie’s death his head, eyes, and mouth are 
described in circular shapes. Later on, Darl represents Vardaman as being “round and his 
eyes round and his mouth beginning to open" (AILD 47). In the same way, after Addie’s 
death, Tull describes Vardaman “look[ing] at [him], his eyes round and black in the 
middle like when you throw a light in a owl’s face” (AILD 70). Vardaman, who is 
traumatized by his mother’s death, attempts to save Addie by carving round holes in her 
coffin. In his despair, Vardaman repeatedly observes buzzards “in little tall black circles 
on the sky” (AILD 197). Ironically, Addie is the center that holds the Bundrens 
together—or, in Eric Sundquist’s words, “the center that no longer holds" (31). In sum, 
the Bundren brothers are depicted within circular imagery. One might say that they long 
for circles: Vardaman longs for a toy train that goes in circles, and Cash demands a 
“graphophone” that plays in circles.  
However, the most significant geometric abstraction in As I Lay Dying is the 
“interplay of verticals and horizontals” (Hattenhauer 147). The most familiar example of 
“verticality transformed into horizontality” is the tree, since “Addie’s coffin and the 
wagon that carries it are both images of trees turned into horizontal planks” (Hattenhauer 
147). Indeed, the description of Addie’s coffin contains a Cubist pictogram. Tull 
observes:  
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They had laid her in it reversed. Cash made it clock-shape, like this with every 
joint and seam bevelled and scrubbed with the plane, tight 
as a drum and neat as a sewing basket, and they had laid her in it 
head to foot so it wouldn’t crush her dress. (AILD 88)   
 
Citing Raynal’s comment—that “cubism attempts through simplification to eliminate the 
changeable”—Tucker analyzes Addie’s reduction to the “status of totem” (396). Laid in 
the coffin, Addie becomes a “polyhedron, a form utterly protean, an angular seed or egg 
seething with perverse life and eager for metempsychosis,” “a cubistic bug” (Tucker 
396).  
In addition to these Cubist object-reductions, Faulkner makes allusions to 
sculpture. Such descriptions as “the square squat shape of the coffin on the sawhorses 
like a cubistic bug” (AILD 219) and “running against the glare like that figure cut from 
tin” (AILD 221) move from the two-dimensional canvas to three-dimensional 
compositions of wood and metal. When Dewey Dell looks down at her mother’s face, “it 
is like a casting of fading bronze upon the pillow” (AILD 51). Lothar Hӧnninghausen 
notes other sculptural effects, like Darl’s observation of Jewel and his horse: “Save for 
Jewel’s legs they are like two figures carved for a tableau savage in the sun” (AILD 12). 
Continuing the Cubist emphasis, Tucker compares Jewel’s relationship with his horse to 
Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2. Depicting a “sexual-filial 
relation, the wooden Jewel [is] borne into the windy heights of Anse's farm by a wooden 
horse” (Tucker 398).  
While Tucker’s interpretation makes sense, another possible influence can be 
found in Surrealism. Where, one might ask, are the circles and planes in the following 
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fantastical description? Jewel’s horse reacts to a whistle, “moving that quick his coat, 
bunching, tongues swirling like so many flames”:  
 When Jewel can almost touch him, the horse stands on his hind legs and slashes 
down at Jewel. Then Jewel is enclosed by a glittering maze of hooves as by an 
illusion of wings; among them, beneath the up-reared chest, he moves with the 
flashing limberness of a snake. For an instant before the jerk comes onto his arms 
he sees his whole body earth-free, horizontal, whipping snake-limber, until he 
finds the horse's nostrils and touches earth again. (AILD 12)  
 
Critics like Tucker err, perhaps, in ascribing too much to Cubism and too little to 
Surrealism. Cubism may “shatter” the natural perspectives and hidden sides of the object-
world, but it is not known for fantastic metamorphoses, as described above. The horse 
raises up and, in an instant, grows “an illusion” of Pegasus “wings,” and then, an instant 
later, shows the “flashing limberness of a snake.” This is more than Cubism.  
Hӧnninghausen argues that Faulkner employs synaesthesia “to dissolve the 
traditionally holistic picture of reality into the perception of details and to dramatize” 
through the viewpoints of Darl and Vardaman (569):  
It is as though the dark were resolving him out of his integrity, into an unrelated 
scattering of components flames …. I see him dissolve—legs, a rolling eye, a 
gaudy splotching like cold flames—and float upon the dark. (AILD 56)  
 
One might read the description above, not through the circles and planes of Cubism, but 
rather through the more fluid fantasies of Surrealism. The same can be said of the 
following passage: 
The air smells like sulphur. Upon the impalpable plane of it their shadows form as 
upon a wall, as though like sound they had not gone very far away in falling but 
had merely congealed for a moment. (AILD 76)  
 
In its reference to “shadow,” the above passage recalls the painterly technique of “cast 
shadow,” where “a shadow of more or less definite shape [is] formed on a surface behind 
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a body that blocks the light” (Pierce 87). A variant of shadowing, chiaroscuro, is the 
“gradation of light and dark within a picture, especially one in which the forms are 
largely determined, not by sharp outlines, but by the meeting of lighter and darker areas” 
(Pierce 19). Faulkner uses shadowing and cast shadow in As I Lay Dying in many 
sections of the novel, but most notably in Vardaman’s section. Vardaman, the 
traumatized child of the Bundrens, is also the one who is granted a Surrealist painter’s 
eyes. For example, Vardaman sees “the dark stand up and go whirling away” (AILD 65). 
A few lines later, he observes “Pa walk[ing] around. His shadow walks around” (65). In 
several places, he repeats the phrase, “He walks around. His shadow walks around” (66) 
or “Pa walks around. His shadow does” (66). Though painted after Faulkner, Remedios 
Varo’s 1962 painting, titled Fenomeno (“Phenomenon”), shows the resources inherent in 
this technique. 
In his Surrealist imaginings, Vardaman sees his mother as fish and horse 
simultaneously.  He perceives her as a fish “cut up into pieces of not-fish now” (AILD 
53). Like Darl’s retreat into Cubism, Vardaman retreats into Surrealism as a defense 
against the truth of her death, which has traumatized him severely. As if to defer his 
recognition of the irreversible tragedy, Vardaman dissects his mother’s image. There is 
even a chapter consisting of one sentence only: “My mother is a fish” (AILD 84).  
In As I Lay Dying, Faulkner demonstrates his mastery of modernist-art 
techniques, which he has transferred from the painted canvas to narrative fiction. As 
Tucker writes, “the novel as a whole exhibits specific cubist techniques” (391). These 
techniques affect the perceptions of individual characters, Darl especially. Surrealism is 
also an influence, though its impact is focused primarily on Vardaman. It is not surprising 
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that different characters would imagine the object-world uniquely, since their 
personalities and perceptions are unique.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The beginning decades of the twentieth century appear to have had revolutionary 
changes in many disciplines, such as philosophy, the visual arts, music, and literature. 
This rapid change is more vivid in the appearance of Phenomenology in philosophy and 
in Cubism in art. What connects these movements—despite of their contradictions and 
differences—is modernism, which, during the first decades of the twentieth century, 
explored new “ways of seeing” in art and “new ways of knowing” in philosophy. As 
noted in the Introduction to this thesis, Phenomenology is a theory whose destination is 
practice; its practice culminates in what Husserl terms the “transcendental attitude.” 
Cubism, by contrast, is a practice that gives birth to theory—specifically, a theory of 
constructionism. 
William Faulkner’s literary art provides a sample for that correlation between 
Husserl’s Phenomenology and Cubism. Faulkner is known to have employed modernist 
art techniques in his novels, particularly The Sound and The Fury and As I Lay Dying. By 
dwelling on the perceptions of characters, his novels also give insight into the workings 
of Husserlian Phenomenology. Having given samples of these twin traditions in 
Faulkner’s fiction, this thesis comes to an end.   
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